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A growing body of research offers evidence 
that CEOs and other top executives show large 
and persistent  person-specific heterogeneity in 
their management styles. Bertrand and Schoar (2003) document that such  person-specific 
styles explain a substantial fraction of the vari-
ation in firms’ capital structures, investment 
decisions, and organizational structures. The 
idea that CEOs greatly differ in their styles is 
also supported by a number of papers that show 
substantial changes in a firm’s stock price and 
accounting performance when its top manage-
ment changes. For example,  Pérez-González (2006) and Bennedsen et al. (2007) focus on 
transitions to family CEOs, and Parrino (1997) 
focuses on internal versus external successors. 
Similarly, a large literature suggests that CEOs’ 
specific traits play a role in their management 
approach. See, for example, Malmendier and 
Tate (2008) on CEO overconfidence; Kaplan, 
Klebanov, and Sorensen (2012) on general 
ability and execution skills; Graham, Harvey, 
and Puri (2013) on optimism and risk aversion; 
and Benmelech and Frydman (2015) on prior 
military experience.1
1 A large literature in management science has also 
looked at the role of CEOs, starting with Hambrick and 
Mason (1984) and Fligstein (1990). See also Kotter (1982), 
Khurana (2002), and Lazear (2004). 
But there is still considerable debate about 
the importance of managerial style. First, there 
is the question of where individual manage-
ment styles come from: do they predominantly 
depend on the optimal, endogenous choice of 
managers, who want to invest in the skill set 
that promises the highest expected returns? Or 
are they shaped by formative events that are 
largely outside a manager’s control? The lat-
ter would imply that managers might not be at 
liberty to change styles, even when they might 
wish to. And if one’s management style depends 
on exposure to certain experiences or learning 
opportunities in a manager’s formative years, 
there might be constraints in the distribution of 
management styles (or skills) available in the 
managerial labor market.
The second question is whether managers 
“matter” to the firms they run. In other words, 
do managerial styles constitute a value added 
or even an idiosyncratic bias that the CEO 
“imposes” on the firm? Or are they just the 
expression of an endogenous choice made by the 
board to purposefully hire managers with certain 
types of skills based on the firm’s needs?2 An 
extreme view of a frictionless CEO labor market 
might suggest that even if CEOs have heteroge-
neous styles, they do not have a causal impact 
on the firms they run, since boards will always 
hire the CEO with the right match of skills for 
the firm. Under this view, CEOs are interchange-
able inputs into the production function, such as 
machines or other capital investments that firms 
undertake. So if the full spectrum of CEO styles 
is abundantly available in the market, there 
2 For example, Eisfeldt and Kuhnen (2013) develop 
a competitive assignment model in which CEOs and 
firms form matches based on multiple characteristics. In 
their model, firm productivity is determined by the match 
between a firm’s skill demand and the supply of the skills of 
its particular manager. 
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should be no systematic impact on the firm or its 
stock price when a new CEO hire is announced. 
However, if frictions exist in the CEO labor mar-
ket or if certain skills are in short supply, then 
not all firms would be able to hire the style of 
CEO they would prefer.
In this paper, we build on Schoar and Zuo (2011), which shows how starting one’s career 
during a recession (as an exogenous formative 
event) affects the manager’s career progression 
and management style. Here we provide evi-
dence on how the market values these recession 
styles: announcement period returns around the 
appointment of recession CEOs are very sig-
nificant and positive; the cumulative abnormal 
return in the three days around the announce-
ment is 1 percent. This positive announcement 
period return is driven by cases where a reces-
sion CEO replaces a  nonrecession CEO. This 
result suggests that the market assigns a positive 
and economically meaningful value to the selec-
tion of a recession CEO.
I. Where Do Managerial Styles Come From?
The empirical literature to date suggests that 
management styles depend on a mix of endog-
enously acquired characteristics and exogenous (formative) events that may lie outside the man-
ager’s control. As an example of endogenously 
acquired skills, Bertrand and Schoar (2003) 
show that managers with an MBA degree fol-
low more aggressive management strategies 
such as higher leverage or more  market-driven 
investing. Custódio and Metzger (2014) find 
that firms headed by CEOs with a career back-
ground in finance hold less cash and more debt 
and make more share repurchases. In an efficient 
labor market, we would expect good managers 
to deliberately acquire these skills, knowing that 
they are valued by the market.
But there is also evidence that early career 
experiences outside a manager’s control can have 
a lasting impact on managers. Our own work, 
Schoar and Zuo (2011), examines the economic 
conditions when a manager enters the labor mar-
ket. We find that CEOs who started their careers 
during a recession have a more conservative 
management style: recession CEOs invest less 
in capital expenditures and R&D, show lower 
overheads, and have significantly lower leverage 
and working capital needs. Firms run by reces-
sion CEOs also have lower stock return volatility 
but a similar rate of return on assets, when com-
pared to firms run by  nonrecession CEOs. A few 
other papers have also looked at the role certain 
formative experiences play in shaping a CEO’s 
management style. For example, Malmendier, 
Tate, and Yan (2011) consider CEOs who grew 
up during the Great Depression, and Benmelech 
and Frydman (2015) analyze CEOs who under-
went a military draft.
Taking formative experiences into account 
does not mean that managers are merely the 
passive recipients of a style that is imposed on 
them. In fact, they might make optimal decisions 
conditional on having been exposed to a certain 
formative event. For example, a manager who 
starts his career during a recession might invest 
in a complementary skill set that allows him to 
deepen his existing knowledge and strengthen 
the image that the market has of his type. Thus, 
a recession CEO might seek to learn more about 
cost cutting and lean management, which might 
go well with the “frugal” image of a reces-
sion CEO. Interestingly, we do not observe the 
reverse behavior in our analysis: we do not see 
managers working actively to undo the style 
predicted by their labor market entry cohort. 
If they did, observable managerial characteris-
tics would not predict behavior. This is in line 
with a new theory paper by Dessein and Santos (2015): in complex and uncertain environments, 
the endogenous allocation of managerial atten-
tion amplifies even small initial manager fixed 
effects.
II. Do Managerial Styles Matter?
We look at the event study returns to the 
appointment announcements of CEOs with dif-
ferent styles. To do so, we again turn to look at 
recession versus  nonrecession CEOs. Our goal 
is to test how investors value the bundle of skills 
that recession CEOs bring to the firm. Since 
markets are forward looking and CEOs are 
not randomly assigned to firms, announcement 
period returns might also reflect the resolution 
of uncertainty about whether the firm would be 
able to hire a CEO with a scarce style.
III. Data
We start with the companies and CEOs 
included in the Executive Compensation (Execucomp) database of Compustat between 
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1992 and 2007, and identify the exact turnover 
date with the Factiva and  Lexis-Nexis databases. 
For each of the CEOs in our sample, we collect 
a host of demographic information (see Schoar 
and Zuo 2011 for more details). We obtain 
information on stock prices from the Center for 
Research in Security Prices (CRSP), accounting 
data from Compustat, and corporate governance 
data from RiskMetrics.
Our sample includes 2,249 CEO turnovers. 
The average age of the incoming CEO is 51; 
the average age of the departing CEO is 59. 
502 (22 percent) incoming CEOs are recession 
CEOs, while 437 (19 percent) departing CEOs 
are recession CEOs. Following Schoar and Zuo (2011), we define recession CEOs as those who 
entered the labor market during a recession. 
Recession periods are based on the business 
cycle dating database of the National Bureau of 
Economic Research (NBER). To avoid endoge-
nous selection of when a manager chose to enter 
the labor market, we proxy for the exogenous 
starting date by using the manager’s birth year 
plus 24, the modal age for starting one’s first 
position over our sample.
IV. Results
To test how investors value the bundle of 
skills that recession CEOs bring to the firm, 
we compare the turnover announcement period 
stock returns for different types of CEOs. 18 
percent of the turnovers in our sample involve 
a recession CEO replacing a  nonrecession CEO; 
15 percent involve a  nonrecession CEO replac-
ing a recession CEO; 4 percent involve a reces-
sion CEO replacing a recession CEO; and for 
the vast majority (62 percent), a  nonrecession 
CEO replaces a  nonrecession CEO.
Over the entire sample, the  three-day (−1, 0, 1) 
 market-adjusted stock price reaction to CEO 
turnovers has a mean of 0.20 percent and a median 
of 0.18 percent; the  three-day  industry-adjusted 
stock price reaction to CEO turnovers has a 
lower mean (0.15 percent) and a lower median (0.11 percent).3 The mean (median) values 
of individual stock returns, market returns 
3 We use  value-weighted market and industry stock 
returns. All results in the paper are almost identical when 
we use  equal-weighted market and industry stock returns. 
Results are also quite similar when we use a  five-day (−2, 
−1, 0, 1, 2) announcement window instead. 
and industry returns over the year prior to the 
CEO turnover announcement are 4.7 percent (2.1 percent), 11.3 percent (12.2 percent), and 
11.1 percent (10.8 percent), respectively. The 
 market-adjusted and  industry-adjusted individ-
ual stock returns over the year prior to the CEO 
turnover announcement have negative means (−0.9 percent and −0.7 percent) and negative 
medians (−2.5 percent and −1.0 percent).4
Table 1 presents the results based on univar-
iate tests. The results based on  market-adjusted 
and  industry-adjusted announcement period 
returns are very similar. We also confirm that 
the results hold when we run multiple regres-
sions that include various controls.5 Panel A 
shows that the average  industry-adjusted return 
is 0.87 percent when the incoming CEO is a 
recession CEO, and −0.05 percent when the 
incoming CEO is a  nonrecession CEO. The 
difference of 0.92 percent is statistically signif-
icant at the 1 percent level. Panel B shows the 
average  industry-adjusted return is 1.19 percent 
when a recession CEO replaces a  nonrecession 
CEO, −0.65 percent when a recession CEO 
replaces a recession CEO, −0.67 percent when 
a  nonrecession CEO replaces a recession CEO, 
and 0.10 percent when a  nonrecession CEO 
replaces a  nonrecession CEO. When we use a 
 nonrecession CEO replacing a  nonrecession 
CEO as the benchmark, the  incremental 
4 To decompose individual stock returns into a 
 market-induced or  industry-induced component and a 
 firm-specific component, we follow the approach devel-
oped in Jenter and Kanaan (2015). Specifically, we run a 
 cross-sectional regression over the entire sample where the 
dependent variable is individual stock returns over the year 
prior to the CEO turnover announcement and the regres-
sor is the market or industry returns over the year prior to 
the CEO turnover announcement. The residuals from these 
regressions are the  market-adjusted or  industry-adjusted 
individual stock returns. All results are quite similar when 
we define  market-adjusted ( industry-adjusted) returns as the 
individual stock returns minus the market (industry) returns 
or when we use  firm-specific betas to do the adjustment. All 
results are also similar when we use unadjusted individual 
stock returns in the regressions. 
5 The set of controls is measured over the year prior to 
the CEO turnover announcement and includes the following: 
the  market-adjusted or  industry-adjusted individual stock 
returns, market or industry stock returns, incoming CEO 
age, departing CEO age, the market value of equity, Tobin’s 
Q, leverage ratio, return on assets, and the average  bid-ask 
spread. The regressions also include decade fixed effects 
(based on the decade in which the incoming CEO was born) 
and year fixed effects (based on the year in which the CEO 
turnover announcement is made). 
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 industry-adjusted stock price reaction is 
1.09 percent for a recession CEO replacing a 
 nonrecession CEO (significant at the 1 per-
cent level), −0.75 percent for a recession CEO 
replacing a recession CEO (not significant), and −0.78 percent for a  nonrecession CEO replac-
ing a recession CEO (significant at the 10 per-
cent level).
We perform several additional analyses. First, 
the positive stock price reaction when a reces-
sion CEO replaces a  nonrecession CEO is stron-
ger for firms with a worse ( market-adjusted or 
 industry-adjusted) stock price performance over 
the year prior to the CEO turnover announce-
ment.6 Second, the positive stock price reaction 
when a recession CEO replaces a  nonrecession 
CEO is stronger for  well-governed firms.7 This 
finding underlines the idea that certain skills are 
6 CEO turnovers following bad firm performance are 
termed “ performance-induced turnovers” in Jenter and 
Lewellen (2014). Jenter and Lewellen (2014) state that many 
turnovers that a standard classification algorithm classifies as 
voluntary (Parrino 1997), are, in fact,  performance-induced 
and likely to be forced. Kaplan and Minton (2012) reach a 
similar conclusion. 
7 To measure corporate governance, we use the gov-
ernance index developed in Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick 
(2003). 
in short supply in the market. In a  well-governed 
firm, investors should have expected that the 
board would try to hire a CEO with the skill 
set the firm needs. The fact that even for these 
firms, the announcement effect of hiring a 
recession CEO is significant and positive sug-
gests that investors are positively surprised that 
an appropriate individual was available in the 
market.
V. Conclusion
The results of this paper suggest that investors 
value the skill set that recession CEOs bring into 
their companies. It is possible that a board selects 
recession CEOs based on the firm’s specific 
needs. However, if it were obvious that a firm 
would always hire a recession CEO when it has 
a specific need for this skill set, the announce-
ment of such a hire should not contain any news 
for the market; all the potential performance 
impact should have been priced in previously. 
Thus, our results show that the announcement of 
a recession CEO hire is seen as unexpected good 
news for a firm, most likely since this skill set is 
in short supply in the market and the announce-
ment confirms that the firm was able to hire this 
type of CEO. But it also implies that the  market 
Table 1—CEO Turnover Announcement Returns (Percent)
Observations
 Market-adjusted
returns
 Industry-adjusted
returns
Panel A. Univariate test by incoming CEO types
(1) Recession CEOs 502 0.91 0.87
 (2) Nonrecession CEOs 1,747 0.00 −0.05
t-test: (1) versus (2) 0.91** 0.92***
Panel B. Univariate test by incoming/departing CEO types
(1) A recession CEO replacing a  nonrecession CEO 413 1.23 1.19
(2) A recession CEO replacing a recession CEO 89 −0.59 −0.65
(3) A  nonrecession CEO replacing a recession CEO 348 −0.57 −0.67
(4) A  nonrecession CEO replacing a  nonrecession CEO 1,399 0.14 0.10
 t-test:
(1) versus (4) 1.09*** 1.09***
(2) versus (4) −0.73 −0.75
(3) versus (4) −0.71* −0.78*
Note: We perform a  two-tailed  t-test of differences in means.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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believes that this particular style has a value 
added for the firm.8
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